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Impersonal Exchange without Impartial Law:
The Community Responsibility System*
Avner Greif**
ABSTRACT
Impartial legal enforcement provided by the state is considered necessary
for impersonal exchange,' implying that the scope of enforcement
determines the extent of the market and hence the division of labor and
related efficiency gains. Yet, the development of effective impartial legal

systems provided by the state to govern exchange relationships is a rather
recent phenomenon. What were, if any, the institutions that enabled

impersonal exchange prior to that development? This paper addresses this
question by examining the European experience. It utilizes a game theoretic
framework and historical analysis to examine the Community Responsibility
System ("CRS") that enabled exchange characterized by separation between
the quid and the quo over time and space that was impersonal, up to one's
community affiliation. The CRS built on self-governed communities, intracommunity (partial) enforcement institutions, and non-contractual joint

communal liability in inter-community disputes that induced communities
to care about their collective reputations.
The analysis touches upon issues central to institutions: the optimal size of

the legal responsibility unit as a function of different units' ability to

This article is a concise presentation of arguments made at greater length in Avner Greif,
Institutions: Theory and Histoy (Cambridge forthcoming 2005). Readers interested in a more
complete discussion and in additional historical examples should find that version helpful.
Department of Economics, Stanford University. National Science Foundation Grants 9009598-01
and 9223974 supported this research. Masahiko Aoki, Gregory Besharov, Brent Daniel Goldfarb,
Avinash Dixit, Albrecht Ritschl, Urs Schweizer, and participants in workshops at the University
of Chicago, Oxford University, Cambridge University, the Hebrew University, Stanford
University, MIT, University of Michigan, Tel Aviv University, Yale University, CIAR, and a Max
Planck Conference provided useful comments. Research assistance by Yadira Gonzalez de Lara,
Courtney Dahlke, and Nese Yelidz was indispensable. Aspects of this research were published in
Avner Greif, ImpersonalExchange and the Origin of Markets: From the Community Reiponsibility System to
Individual Legal Responsibilioy in Pre-Modem Europe, in Masahiko Aoki and Yujiro Hayami, eds,
Communities and Markets in Economic Development 3 (Oxford 2001); Avner Greif, Institutions and
Impersonal Exchange: From Communal to Individual Responsibiliy, 158 J Inst & Theoretical Econ 168
(Mar 2002).
Douglass C. North, Institutions,5J Econ Perspectives 97 (Winter 1991).
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identify, monitor, and punish wrongdoers; the endogenous elicitation of
impartial justice from partial courts; the role of self-governed organizations
that fall between the ways in which we model the state and communities;
the complementarities between reputational mechanisms and those relying
on coercive power; the importance of the distinction between personal and
communal identities; how institutions endogenously determine if agents
condition entering an exchange on the revelation of information regarding
personal and communal identity or past actions or both; and the importance
of overlapping generations' organizations, such as communities, in
facilitating inter-organizational impersonal exchange based on reputation
despite each individual's finite life span.
JEL Classification: NO, N2, C7.)
I. INTRODUCTION
Impersonal exchange is central to economic growth; however, we know
surprisingly little about the historical development of the institutions that
supported it. In considering the institutional foundations of exchange, the
economic literature has emphasized reputation-based personal exchange on the
one hand and impersonal exchange based on an impartial legal system on the
other. Reputation-based institutions support personal exchange by enabling
repeatedly interacting economic agents to commit ex ante to adhere to
contractual obligations ex post based on the (correct) expectations that
misconduct will lead to a loss of future gains from exchange. Law-based
institutions support impersonal exchange based on a third-party impartial
enforcer with coercive power, ex post verifiability of actions, and legal
sanctions. 2

Impartial and effective legal systems, however, are a relatively recent
development, and, more importantly, impersonal exchange seems to have
historically preceded their development. During the Late Medieval Commercial
Revolution, long-distance trade substantially expanded, and merchants from
different corners of Europe extensively entered into what seems to have been
impersonal exchange characterized by a separation between the quid and the quo

2

For surveys and discussions, see Avner Greif, The Fundamental Problem of Exchange: A Research

Agenda in Historical Institutional Analysis, 4 Eur Rev Econ Hist 251 (Dec 2000); John McMillan,
Reinventing the Bazaar A Natural History of Markets (W.W. Norton 2002); Avinash Dixit, Trade
Expansion and Contract Enforcement Oan 20, 2003) (working paper, Princeton University), available
online at <http://www.russellsage.org/Merchant2/working-papers.shtml>
(visited Mar 28,
2004); Avinash K. Dixit, Lawlessness and Economics: Alternative Modes of Governance (Princeton
forthcoming May 2004). For inter-relationships between legal and reputation-based institutions
see, for example, Avner Greif, Cultural Beliefs and the OeganiZation of Society: A Historical and

TheoreticalReflection on Collectivist and Individualist Societies, 102 J Pol Econ 912 (Oct 1994); Rachel E.
Kranton, Reciprocal Exchange: A Self-Sustaining System, 86 Am Econ Rev 830 (Sept 1996); Simon

Johnson, John McMillan, and Christopher Woodruff, Courts and Relational Contracts, 18 J L, Econ,
& Org 221 (2002).
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over time and space: credit, contracts for future delivery, negotiable securities,
and maritime insurance are a few examples.3
What institutions, if any, facilitated impersonal exchange in the absence of
impartial, third-party contract enforcement provided by the state and its legal
system? This paper addresses the question by examining the nature and
endogenous dynamics of institutions that supported impersonal exchange
characterized by a separation in time and space between the quid and the quo in
pre-modem Europe from the late medieval period.
Addressing this question relates to a central issue in understanding the
process of development and the role of contract enforcement institutions in this
process. The historical process of market development is seen as a process of
institutional evolution that supplemented reputation mechanisms with impartial
legal enforcement. Where reputation-based institutions enable only personal
exchange, impartial legal enforcement enables exchange that is impersonal in the
sense that one's decision to exchange is not conditional on knowing a current
partner's past actions, the expectations of future trading, or the ability to
transmit information regarding past conduct to others.4 Reputation-based
exchange is characterized by a low fixed cost but a high marginal cost of
exchanging with unfamiliar individuals.5 Law-based exchange, however, is
characterized by the high fixed cost required to set up an effective legal system
but the low marginal cost of establishing new exchange relationships.
Establishing an exchange based on the law amounts to providing a public good,
therefore relying on overcoming the associated collective action problem.6
Furthermore, establishing an effective legal system requires institutions that will
enable a state to commit to not abusing property rights.
But historically, if exchange began based on personal relationships within
relatively small groups, the emergence of the impartial legal system that
facilitates impersonal exchange in contemporary developed economies requires
3

See, for example, Henri Pirenne, A History of Europefrom the Invasions to the XVI Century (University
Books 1955); Robert S. Lopez, The Commercial Revolution of the Middle Ages, 950-1350 (Cambridge
1976).

4

See, for example, John Shuhe Li, The Benefits and Costs of Relation-BasedGovernance:An Explanationof
the East Asian Miracle and Crisis (City University of Hong Kong, Working Paper No 136, June
2000), available online at <http://www.cityu.edu.hk/ef/research/paper/136.pdf> (visited Mar
28, 2004); Dixit, Trade Expansion and Contract Enforcement (cited in note 2); Dixit, Lawlessness and
Economics ch 4 (cited in note 2).

5

Greif, 102 J Pol Econ at 912 (cited in note 2); Li, The Benefits and Costs of Relation-Based Governance
(cited in note 4).
Li, The Benefits and Costs of Relation-Based Governance (cited in note 4); Dixit, Trade Expansion and
ContractEnforcement ch 4 (cited in note 2).

6

7

Avner Greif, On the Inter-relations and Economic Implications of Economic, Social, Political,and Normative
Factors: Reflections from Two Late Medieval Sodeies, in John N. Drobak and John V.C. Nye, The
Frontiersof the New InstitutionalEconomics 57 (Academic 1997).
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an explanation. Why was a legal system supporting impersonal exchange
established despite the high fixed cost if the volume of impersonal exchange was
initially low? We know that theoretical contracting efficiency alone does not lead
to a transition from one system of contract enforcement to another.8 More
broadly, what institutions, if any, facilitated impersonal exchange in the absence
of impartial, third-party contract enforcement provided by the state and its legal
system?
The historical and theoretical analysis in this paper suggests the importance
of institutions that support impersonal exchange but are based neither on
expectations that misconduct will lead to a loss of reputation nor on third-party
impartial legal enforcement. Rather, these institutions are based on social units
that blur the boundaries between the way we model communities of economic
agents and the state. On the one hand they have coercive ability vis- -vis their
members, but, on the other hand, their legal system is directly controlled by the
economic agents and is partial in the sense that it directly reflects their economic
objectives. This legal system neither serves the principle of justice nor is it
motivated to do so by a third party, such as the state.
These institutions are based on involuntary collective liability of members
of the social unit in their interactions with others making the concern with the
loss of the social unit's reputation central to their operation. This leads to the
endogenous provision of impartial justice meted out by the court partial to the
social unit because the court is motivated to punish a member who cheated a
non-member, fearing the loss of collective reputation. Hence, reputational
considerations and coercive power jointly underpin the operation of the
institution. This collective responsibility also enables economic agents to commit
to honesty in impersonal exchange despite their finite life spans because the
social unit becomes an infinitely lived player that internalizes the cost of a
member's cheating.
Involuntary collective responsibility also alters the informational
underpinning of exchange in the absence of impartial, third-party legal
enforcement. Instead of requiring information regarding one's past conduct, it
requires knowledge of one's social and personal identities. Works on reputation
mechanisms have concentrated on the importance of public information
regarding past actions in fostering institutions based on multilateral reputation.
If information regarding past actions is public, then a multilateral reputation
mechanism can motivate honesty.9 This mechanism rests on the credible threat

8

Greif, 102 J Pol Econ at 912 (cited in note 2); Kranton, 86 Am Econ Rev at 830 (cited in note 2).

9

Kandori and Ellison demonstrated that in infinitely-repeated prisoners' dilemma games,
impersonal exchange can be possible based on contagious equilibria. Michihiro Kandori, Social
Norms and Community Enforcement, 59 Rev Econ Studies 63 (Jan 1992); Glenn Ellison, Cooperationin
the Prisoner'sDilemma with Anonymous Random Matcbing, 61 Rev Econ Studies 567 (July 1994). Such
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that all future partners to the exchange would condition exchange on one
another's past conduct. Those who cheated in the past forgo the gains from
future exchange.' ° Theoretically, institutions based on collective responsibility
enable the economic agents to commit without the need to condition future
choices on their past conduct. Mechanisms enabling individuals to credibly
communicate their social and personal identities are substituted for mechanisms
for contract enforcement based on public information regarding past actions.
Collective responsibility can thus foster impersonal exchange when past actions
are not public information and personal identities cannot be credibly
communicated across communal boundaries in the absence of collective
responsibility.
In the particular context of pre-modern Europe, the social units
underpinning the institution that enabled impersonal exchange were selfgoverned communities: the communes, which fall into the grey area between
communities and states as we commonly conceptualize them. They were similar
to communities in that they were characterized by intra-community personal
familiarity, yet, like a state, they had a (geographically) local monopoly over the
legal use of coercive power. Their legal systems, however, were partial and
reflected the interests of their members rather than the principles of impartial
justice or incentives provided by a third party. These communities provided the
basis for the Community Responsibility System ("CRS") that enabled large-scale
impersonal exchange characterized by a separation between the quid and the quo
over time and space throughout Europe from probably as early as the tenth
century.
The organizational structure of the CRS was such that merchants could
learn the communal and personal identities of their partners in an exchange,
rather than their past conduct. Community courts held every member of another
community jointly liable for default by a member of his community in intercommunity exchange. The goods of every member of a cheater's community
were impounded if that community refused compensation." This communal
liability-which was neither contractual nor voluntary for an individual
merchant-implied a concern with communal reputation. A community could

10

11

equilibria, however, do not exist in games of exchange, which are inherently one-sided prisoners'
dilemma games. See Greif, 4 Eur Rev Econ Hist at 251 (cited in note 2).
See, for example, Avner Greif, Reputation and Coalitions in Medieval Trade: Evidence on the Maghribi
Traders, 49 J Econ Hist 857 (Dec 1989); Avner Greif, Contract Enforceabiliy and Economic Institutions
in Early Trade: The Maghribi Traders' Coalition, 83 Am Econ Rev 525 (1993); Greif, 102 J Pol Econ
at 912 (cited in note 2); P.R. Milgrom, D.C. North, and B.R. Weingast, The Role of Institutionsin the
Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs, 2 Econ & Pol 1 (1990);
Kandori, 59 Rev Econ Studies at 63 (cited in note 9).
"Impound" (namely, to take legal or formal possession of goods to be held in custody of the law),
"confiscation" (namely, seizure under public authority), and distraint seem appropriate here.
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avoid compensation for a default in inter-community exchange, but at the cost
of losing the gains from any future trade. Hence, although a community's courts
were partial and represented the interests of their finitely-lived members, they
were motivated to utilize their local monopolies over coercive power to provide
impartial justice, punish a community member who defaulted, and compensate
for the damage. Communities were thus ongoing, infinitely-lived organizations
that internalized the cost of a default by each member on others. Finally,
anticipating compensation, merchants were motivated to learn the communal
and personal identities of their partners to an exchange and could credibly
commit to complain in case of default despite the cost involved.
The CRS was not without costs: it generated strategic uncertainty due to
asymmetric information and limited monitoring ability, inter-communal disputes
occurred, entailing confiscation of merchandise and inability to trade. Hence,
communities devised means to reduce these costs and institute a better system.
During the thirteenth century, pressure to alter the CRS system was particularly
strong. Ironically, it was the same processes that it fostered-those through
which trade expanded and merchants' communities grew in size, number, and
economic and social heterogeneity-that reduced its economic efficiency and
intra-community political viability.
Yet the ability to replace the CRS with an alternative institution depended
on the political environment. In some countries, such as England, the political
system was conducive to a transition to legal contract enforcement based on
individual legal responsibility and a legal system in which incentives to the
adjudicators were provided by the polity. Even there, however, this transition
was not a single event but a gradual process, as it required establishing new legal
mechanisms, creating administrative capacity, providing the appropriate
incentives to those administrating the system and adjudicating disputes, and
creating shared beliefs among merchants regarding the effectiveness of the new
system. In other countries, such as Germany and Italy, where the polity was too
fragmented to accomplish such a task, a centralized alternative to the CRS did
not emerge in the centuries immediately following the thirteenth century. The
transition to the system that prevails today, in which individual liability is the rule
and collective responsibility is consensual and contractual, seems not to have
occurred, at some places, until as late as the seventeenth century.
This paper is most directly related to the growing literature examining the
historical development of institutions that supported pre-modern European
market expansion.12 The literature focuses on institutions that supported long12

It also relates to the literature on collective reputation. See, for example, Jean Tirole, A Theory of
Collective Reputations (with Applications to the Persistence of Corruption and to FirmQualioy), 63 Rev Econ
Studies 1 (1996). See also Maitreesh Ghatak and Timothy W. Guinnane, The Economics of Lending
witb Joint Liabiliy: Theory and Pracice, 60 J Development Econ 195 (1999) (voluntary collective
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3
fostering capital
distance trade by facilitating agency relationships,
5
14 and securing property rights abroad.
exchange
Impersonal
mobilization,
focus of
the
is
characterized by separation in time between the quid and the quo
6 This paper highlights the importance of
Milgrom, North, and Weingast.
expanding this line of inquiry, and of examining contract enforcement
institutions more generally, to also consider the endogenous creation and
transmission of personal identity, the endogenous incentive for the legal system
7
to be partial, the use of coercive power in enforcing contracts, and the role of
ongoing organizations in fostering inter-organizational, reputation-based
8
exchange although each economic agent is finitely-lived.
The prevalence of historical documents reflecting aspects of the CRS has
9
been noticed by an earlier generation of scholars. By and large, however, these
scholars viewed it as an archaic and barbaric system-a relic of the past that
hindered, rather than advanced, trade. The analysis presented here, however,
suggests that it served a useful purpose.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II discusses the issue of exchange
characterized by separation between the quid and the quo during the late medieval

13

14

15
16
17

18

19

responsibility in micro-lending); and Jeremy Bulow and Kenneth Rogoff, A Constant Recontracting
Model ofSovereign Debt, 97 J Pol Econ 155 (1989) (sovereign debt).
Greif, 49J Econ Hist at 857 (cited in note 10); Greif, 83 Am Econ Rev at 525 (cited in note 10);
Greif, 102J Pol Econ at 912 (cited in note 2).
Yadira Gonziles de Lara, Institutionsfor Contract Enforcement and Risk-Sharing: From Debt to Equity in
Late Medieval Venice (Oct 18, 2001), available online at <http://fausto.eco.unibs.it/-segdse/
paperseminari/th-paper.pdf> (visited Mar 28, 2004).
Avner Greif, Paul Milgrom, and Barry R. Weingast, Coordination, Commitment and Enforcement: The
Case of the Merchant Guild, 102 J Pol Econ 745 (1994).
Milgrom, North, and Weingast, 2 Econ & Pol at 1 (cited in note 10).
Avner Greif and Eugene Kandel, Contract Enforcement Institutions: HistoricalPerspective and Current
Status in Russia, in Edward P. Lazear, ed, Economic Transitionin Eastern Europe and Russia: Realities of
Reform 291 (Hoover Institution 1995); Dixit, Lawlessness and Economics ch 4 (cited in note 2).
Bull and Kreps, among others, noted that interactions among finitely-lived agents within an ongoing organization enable reputation mechanisms to support exchange among them. Clive Bull,
The Existence of Se!f-Enforcing Implicit Contracts,102 Q J Econ 147 (1987); David M. Kreps, Coporate
Culture and Economic Theory, in James E. Alt and Kenneth A. Shepsle, eds, Perspectives on Positive
Poltical Economy 90 (Cambridge 1990). The credible threat that future members would not
exchange with current ones if they cheat the previous generation supports cooperation. Steven
Tadelis noted that separation between one's identity and an economic entity can enable a business
owner to commit to honesty despite his finite life span because he can sell the business in his old
age. What's In a Name? Reputation as a TradeableAsset, 89 Am Econ Rev 548 (1999).
See, for example, Pietro Santini, Appunti Sulla Vendetta Privata, in 18 Archivio Storico Italiano 162
(GP Vieusseux 1886); Gino Arias, I Trattati Commeriali della Repubblica Fiorentina (Successori le
Monnier 1901); Frederic William Maitland and Mary Bateson, eds, The Charters of the Borough of
Cambridge (Cambridge 1901); J.H. le Patourel, The Medieval Administration of the Channel Islands,
1199-1399 (Oxford 1937); Ellen Wedemeyer Moore, The Fairs of Medieval England:An Introductory
Study (Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies 1985).
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period. Section III discusses the issue of impersonal exchange during the same
period. Section IV presents an intuitive discussion of a theory of the community
responsibility system. Section V utilizes the insights of the theoretical analysis, as
well as information from contracts, tribunal records, charters, and royal and
community regulations, to evaluate the extent to which a community
responsibility system indeed functioned in Europe during that time. Section VI
briefly discusses the decline of the CRS.
II. EXCHANGE CHARACTERIZED BY SEPARATION
BETWEEN THE QUID AND THE QUO DURING THE
COMMERCIAL REVOLUTION

The historical records indicate that exchange characterized by a separation
between the quid and the quo over time and space was common in western
Europe during the late medieval Commercial Revolution, perhaps for the first
time since the fall of the Roman Empire. In towns, fairs, and marketplaces,
merchants provided and received credit, bought and sold through contracts for
future delivery, and insured the cargo they shipped overseas.20 While we cannot
qualitatively measure the efficiency contribution of such exchange relations, they
were arguably great.2 1
The historical records also reflect the identity of the individuals who
entered into exchange characterized by a separation between the quid and the quo
over time and space during the Commercial Revolution. Exchanges were often
conducted among people who lived near each other.22 But exchange
characterized by a separation between the quid and the quo was often established
among merchants who did not live near each other. For example, around the
middle of the century traders from Asti regularly sold northern textiles imported
from the Champagne Fairs on credit to Genoese traders.23 Credit arrangements
20

21

22

23

For a description of these developments, see, for example, Robert S. Lopez and Irving W.
Raymond, Medieval Trade in the Mediterranean World 157-238 (Columbia 1955); R. de Roover, The
O~ganiZaionof Trade, in M.M. Postan, E.E. Rich, and Edward Miller, eds, 3 The Cambridge Economic
History of Europe: Economic Organization and Policies in the Middle Ages 42 (Cambridge 1963); M.M.
Postan, Medieval Trade and Finance (Cambridge 1973).
Lopez, the eminent historian of the Commercial Revolution, viewed credit as a necessity for the
occurrence of commercial expansion in a period with a monetary system based upon a limited
supply of precious metal. The "take-off [of the Commercial Revolution] was fueled not by a
massive input of cash, but by a closer collaboration of people using [commercial] credit." Lopez,
The Commercial Revolution of the Middle Ages at 72 (cited in note 3).
See, for example, Herman van der Wee, Monetagy, Credit and Banking Systems, in E.E. Rich and C.H.
Wilson, eds, 5 The Cambridge Economic Histogy of Europe: The Economic OTganization of Early Modem
Europe 290, 300 (Cambridge 1977).
R.L. Reynolds, The Marketfor Northern Textiles in Genoa, 1179-1200, 8 Revue Beige de Philologie et
d'Histoire 831 (1929); R.L. Reynolds, Merchants of Arras and the Overland Trade with Genoa Twelfth
Centuy, 9 Revue Beige de Philologie et d'Histoire 493 (1930); Robert L. Reynolds, Genoese Trade in
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among individuals from other localities are frequently mentioned in Genoa's
historical records.24 Similarly, contracts for future delivery among individuals
from distant localities were common in Italy, England, and France. At the Fairs
of Champagne, where much of the trade between northern and southern
Europe was conducted during the twelfth and the thirteenth centuries,
merchants from different localities frequently entered into contracts for future
delivery.2"
Contract enforceability is necessary for any exchange but enforcement is
particularly important in exchange characterized by separation between the quid
and the quo. In the absence of appropriate institutions, a borrower, for example,
can enrich himself after obtaining a loan by not repaying his debt. Expecting
such behavior ex post, a borrower would not lend ex ante. Similarly, a merchant
who is paid to deliver goods in the future will find it optimal to retain possession
of these goods, implying that the buyer would not be willing to pay ex ante.
Hence, exchange characterized by separation over time and space between the
quid and the quo requires contract enforcement institutions that enable the
transacting parties to commit ex ante to carry out their contractual obligations ex
post.
What were the institutions that enabled such exchange during the
Commercial Revolution? How could a twelfth-century borrower from Lucca, for
example, commit himself ex ante to repay ex post a debt to a lender from
London? Did late medieval Europe develop contract enforcement institutions

24

25

the Late Twelfth Century, Particularyin Cloth from the Fairs of Champagne, 3 J Econ & Bus Hist 362
(1931); R.D. Face, Techniques of Business in the Trade between the Fairsof Champagne and the South of
Europe in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries, 10 Econ Hist Rev 427 (1958).
In 1190, for example, two Genoese traders, Bonifacius della Volta and Nicola Mallonus, bought
goods from a Piacenzan merchant for 120 lira with one year to pay. On the 28th of March, 1210,
Rubeus de Campo of Genoa paid a debt of one hundred marks sterling in London on behalf of
Vivianus Jordanus from Lucca. Mario Chiaundano, ed, 2 Il Cartolaredi GiovanniScriba, No 669 (S.
Lattes & C. Editori 1935) (see also Nos 138 and 139); H.C. Krueger and R.L. Reynolds, 1 Notai
liguri del Sec. XII e del XIII vi Lanfranco (1202-1226) at 234 (SocietA Ligure di Storia Patria 1951).
Credit transactions among individuals from distant localities were not confined to Italy. They
were common in England during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries among English merchants
from different cities and among English merchants and French, Flemish, and German traders.
See, for example, Calendarof the Patent Rolls Preserved in the Public Record Office, 1266-1272 at 20 (His
Majesty's Stationery Office 1913); David C. Douglas and George W. Greenaway, eds, 2 English
HistoricalDocuments, 1042-1189 at 954-46 (Oxford 1968); Postan, Medieval Trade and Finance (cited
in note 20).
For example, in 1191 a Genoese merchant named Ugo Mallonus bought from a Pavian and a
Roman five bales of fustian of Pavia at forty pieces per bale, including thirteen vermilion, six
green, and the rest brown, and contracted to buy three more bales at mid-Lent and another two at
Easter. Margaret W. Hall, Hilmar C. Krueger, and Robert L. Reynolds, 1 Notai LIguti DelSec. XII,
respect to England and France, see Moore, The
Guglielmo Cassinese (1190-92), No 250 (1938). With
Fairs of Medieval England (cited in note 19); C. Verlinden, Markets and Fairs, in Postan, Rich, and
Miller, eds, 3 The CambridgeEconomic Histoy of Europe 119 (cited in note 20).
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that enabled impersonal exchange? Or was exchange confined to personal
exchange in which repeated interactions or family relationships mitigated the
commitment problem? Given the available historical evidence, we cannot
address this question by tracing the exchange relationships of individual
merchants over time. Hence, to examine the extent to which impersonal
exchange was possible in pre-modern Europe, one has to determine whether an
institution that enabled it then existed.
The absence of one institution is rather clear. In the early days of the
period under consideration there was no state with a legal system capable of
effectively supporting impersonal exchange among individuals from distant
localities. Local courts existed throughout Europe and they could supervise and
enforce contracts executed in the areas under their authority. They had the
ability to provide contract enforcement for exchange only among individuals
present in the (limited) territorial area over which they had legal jurisdiction.26
But the law was absent in yet another sense. By and large, local courts were
not unbiased agents of a central legal authority or impartial dispensers of justice.
Rather, more often than not, they were arguably the embodiment of local
interests and were prejudiced in their judgments against foreigners. Indeed, local
courts in the countryside as well as in cities were controlled by the local landed
or urban elite. But substantiating the assertion that such courts were partial and
their judgments reflected the interests of this elite group is a subtle challenge. It
is particularly problematic to provide evidence regarding partiality with respect
to alien merchants because, as discussed below, under the CRS these courts
would provide--on the equilibrium path-impartial justice exactly because they
were partial.
Yet many of the documents cited within this article explicitly reflect
contemporary distrust of the impartiality of courts.2 7 Precisely because there was
no impartial legal system that was effective over a large geographical area, the
conventional wisdom among economic historians is that prior to the rise of the
state, impersonal exchange was either absent or at most confined to spot
26

27

This was the case even within a relatively well-organized political unit (such as England); there
was no legal system that could provide the required enforcement. T.F.T. Plucknett, Legislation of
Edward I at 142 (Oxford 1949); Walter Ashburner, ed, The Rhodian Sea-Law (Clarendon 1909);
Postan, Medieval Trade and Finance (cited in note 20); Hubert Hall, ed, 2 Select Cases concerning the Law
Merchant,A.D. 1239-1633 (46 Selden Society, B. Quaritch 1930).
Furthermore, in England we find that local courts provided partial justice to local peasants,
making it more reasonable that these courts, in the absence of a countervailing force, would have
dispensed unequal justice to non-locals. See, for example, Barbara Hanawalt Westman, The Peasant
Family and Crime in Fourteenth-CenturyEngland, 13 J Brit Studies 1 (May 1974). Court deliberations in
Italy also reflect partiality. For example, profitability considerations, rather than concern for
impartial justice, motivated early fourteenth-century Siena courts to deny retroactive limitedliability status to insolvent banks. See Edward D. English, Enterprise andLiabihi in Sienese Banking,
1230-1350 (Medieval Academy of America 1988).

Vo15 No 1

ImpersonalExchange without ImpartialLaw

Greif

exchange supported by local courts. In the absence of effective impartial justice,
only personal exchange based on personal familiarity and interactions was
possible.28
This conclusion, however, ignores the particularities of the historical
context in which European medieval trade was conducted: the particular social
and institutional context of communities. These were self-governed
communities-or communes-in the medieval sense of the word, and most of
the towns west of the Baltic Sea in the north and the Adriatic Sea in the south
acquired this status during the late medieval period. Like a state, these
communes had enforcement institutions. Like a community, their members were
personally familiar with each other, while the objective function of their
enforcement institutions was arguably to advance the interest of their members
rather than serving impartial justice. 29 Gaining affiliation with a commune or
severing it was usually a lengthy and costly process-in the extreme case of
Venice, one had to pay tax for twenty-five years to acquire citizenship. More
generally, immigration was costly and risky during this period.
Is it theoretically possible that these communities provided the foundation
institution that supported inter-community impersonal exchange
an
for
characterized by distance between the quid and the quo? And if so, did this
institution prevail in late medieval Europe?
III. THE COMMUNITY RESPONSIBILITY SYSTEM: THEORY
This Section presents the theoretical argument as to why communities
could have been a part of an institution enabling impersonal exchange. It first
examines the conditions under which exchange that is impersonal-in the sense
of not being based on bilateral, repeated interactions-can be an equilibrium
outcome in the absence of communities. It then argues that the conditions
required for such an equilibrium did not prevail in the late medieval period. It
concludes by presenting why, when communities exist, impersonal exchange
among members of different communities can be an equilibrium outcome. For
3
ease of exposition, technical details are suppressed. "
Consider a repeated, random matching game between lenders and
borrowers who are engaged (without loss of generality) in credit transactions.
Such exchange, as is generally the case, is best modeled as a one-sided prisoners'
dilemma game.31 Each borrower can decide whether to initiate exchange with a

28
29

30
31

See, for example, North, 5 J Econ Perspectives at 97 (cited in note 1).
See below regarding the roles of other bodies, such as guilds, having the same function as the
commune in the CRS. For the ease of presentation, I concentrate here on communes.
For details, see Avner Greif, Institutions: Theoy andHistogy (Cambridge forthcoming 2005).
Greif, 4 Eur Rev Econ Hist at 251 (cited in note 2).
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lender (travel to trade) or not. Every borrower who initiates an exchange is
matched with a lender. A lender who is matched with a borrower can decide
whether to lend (a finite amount) or not. The payoffs are such that lending is
efficient and profitable to both parties, conditional on the borrower paying his
debt, but the borrower is better off by not paying than repaying. Assume that
the frequency of matching between any two players is sufficiently low that the
bilateral reputation mechanism (in which a borrower repays fearing losing the
gains from future exchange with this particular lender) can not induce honesty.
The necessary and sufficient conditions for exchange based on a reputation
mechanism in the above model, however, are that the economic agents are
infinitely-lived or that the per-period probability that a borrower will leave the
game is sufficiently low; information regarding past actions is public
information; identities are known; and borrowers are sufficiently patient. In this
case, there is a sub-game perfect equilibrium ("SGPE") with lending on the
equilibrium path. Specifically, the following strategies constitute such an
equilibrium: a borrower initiates an exchange but repays if and only if he has
never defaulted before; a lender lends only to a borrower who has never cheated
before. If the above conditions are believed by the economic agents to hold and
it is expected that each would follow the above strategy, a multilateral reputation
mechanism supports impersonal exchange. It is known ex ante that a borrower
will pay because otherwise he would lose future gains from exchange with all the
lenders.
Yet, even exchange that is impersonal in the above limited sense of being
based on a multilateral reputation mechanism, could not have supported
exchange during the late medieval period. If there is one thing we know with
certainty about late medieval traders, it is that their life spans were finite. There
was uncertainty about when exactly one would perish, but life expectancy was
relatively short and advanced age was difficult to conceal. As noted by Hart, it is
inappropriate to model economic agents as infinitely lived.32 Even ignoring this
problem, the above institution does not endogenously enable and motivate
lenders to distribute and acquire information. Cheating is directly observed by
the individuals involved in the exchange. But why would a lender be motivated
to take the costly actions required to inform all other lenders that he had been
cheated? In the late medieval period these costs had to have been very high
given the communication and transportation technology, the large number of
merchants, and the large geographical area in which they operated. Indeed, how
would a late medieval trader, even if he wanted to inform others that cheating
had occurred, have been technologically able to distribute this information?
Finally, given the large number of medieval traders, how could one
communicate the identity of someone who had cheated him? The photograph,
32

Oliver Hart, Norms and the Theogy ofthe Firm, 149 U Pa L Rev 1701 (2001).
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driver license, and passport were not invented yet. Indeed, most commoners did
not even have a last name during this period. Hence, the problem was not only
that of transmitting the identity of a cheater to others but also learning about it
to begin with. In the absence of supporting institutions, one would have to rely
on a statement from his exchange partner regarding his identity. But how could
one commit to revealing his true identity if doing so would make it possible to
punish him ex post?
Can an institution based on intra-community personal familiarity and
contract enforcement institutions enable inter-community, impersonal exchange
by simultaneously mitigating all the above problems-specifically, the end-game
problem of merchants' finite life spans, the technological and strategic problems
associated with the generation and circulation of information about past actions,
and the problem associated with one's inability to independently verify the
identity of another person and communicate it? Furthermore, can these
problems be mitigated despite the fact that intra-community enforcement
institutions during the late medieval period were partial?
To address these questions, extend the above basic model in the following
way.33 Each player lives for T periods: T - 1 periods of trading and one period of
"retirement." In each period the old cohort of borrowers and lenders dies and is
replaced. There are two communities:34 all borrowers are members of
community B, and all lenders are members of community L. A community has
several features. Each community has a territory and all lending and repayment
is made in the lenders' territory. Each community has an enforcement
institution-a monopoly over coercive power-within its territory. Let "LC"
denote the lenders' enforcement institution and "BC" the borrowers'
enforcement institution.
As the self-governed community in the late medieval period had their own
courts, and these courts represented the interests of the community's members,
assume that a community court's payoff is the net present value of the sum of
the payoffs of the community's living members.35 Two assumptions are implicit
in the above specification. The first is that each community member's payoff has
an equal weight in the court's objective function. This clearly did not hold in all
times and places and is used here as a benchmark case. The second implicit
assumption is that courts don't care about the welfare of future members or

33

For the technical analysis, see Greif, Insfitutions (cited in note 30).

34

The analysis is robust to multiple borrowers' communities but is sensitive to assuming multiple
lenders' communities. See below.

35

That is, members of cohorts 0 to T; the court's value function at the end of a period is the same
as in the beginning of the next period.
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respect the "honor" of the commune. Relaxing this assumption would only
strengthen the results presented below.36
The important aspects of the players' action sets are the following. The BC
can establish an organization in the lenders' community territory certifying the
communal and personal identity of a borrower. It can also penalize any
borrower in its territory and transfer the funds to the LC. The LC can impound
the goods of borrowers present in its territory and distribute these funds or
those provided by the BC within the lenders' community. Although impounding
of one's goods reduces their value, it is profitable to the court. An individual
borrower's past actions are private information, but they can be verified ex post
at cost by the courts following a costly complaint about cheating by a lender.
Note that making a parallel assumption of verification in the game without
communities would not change the equilibrium set. A lender still would not be
motivated to reveal past cheating to a new lender to induce verification because
the cheated lender would not recover the cost of complaining. Each court has to
bear some cost of verification. Assume for the moment that a court's actions are
publicly observable. In the equilibrium examined below, lenders and borrowers
would have an incentive to learn about the courts' actions.37
In this game, under certain conditions, there is an SGPE with lending on
the equilibrium path. The main actions in the associated strategy combination
are the following. The BC establishes an identity-certifying organization. The
state is that of cooperation as long as the LC has never confiscated goods
without a valid complaint, or refused to return confiscated goods once
compensated for default, or the BC has refused to pay compensation following a
default. In the state of cooperation, borrowers travel to trade, are honest, and
pay compensation if demanded of them, and lenders verify identities, lend, and
complain if and only if cheated. The LC verifies complaints and demands
compensation for the loss only if the complaint is valid while the BC verifies
complaints, compensates only if the complaint is valid, and penalizes the

36

1 assume away the possibility of bribes because decisions over disputes in inter-community

exchange were made by a community's representatives and involved many decisionmakers. In
Florence, for example, prior to 1250, initiating actions over disputes in inter-community exchange
was the responsibility of the city administrator and his council. By 1325, in order to take such
actions the city administrator had to make two requests to the Commune to get approval. In
1415, the statute detailing the rules for such actions specified that they were under the authority
of consuls responsible for crafts and trade and no longer under the authority of the city's
administrator. Yet, for these consuls to initiate actions in inter-community disputes the actions
had to be approved by two additional bodies, the Consuls of the Popolo and the Consuls of the
Commune. Santini, Appunti Sulla Vendetta Privataat 168-72 (cited in note 19).
37

For simplicity, the game omits two important features of the situation: the first is the cost to a
lender of verifying the communal and personal identity of a particular borrower. This assumption
does not qualitatively change the analysis. The second feature is the presence of many
communities. I will return to this issue below.
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borrower who defaulted by up to the total cost implied by his default and the
legal process. If the state is not that of cooperation, lenders do not lend,
borrowers do not travel, a borrower defaults on a loan if he obtains one, and the
LC confiscates the goods of a borrower who comes to trade.
The following are the main conditions for this strategy combination to be
an equilibrium. First, the punishment that the BC can inflict on a borrower is
sufficiently high to render default unprofitable (and hence a borrower prefers to
pay). The value of future gains from trade to the borrowers' community and the
value of impounded goods (minus the cost of validating a complaint) is
sufficiently high to induce the BC to compensate for default. The value of future
gains from trade to the lenders' community is higher than the confiscated value
of the goods of all the borrowers and hence, the LC does not find it optimal
confiscate these goods and lose gains from future trade.
Theoretically then, a CRS-an institution encompassing both the above
organizations (communities, community courts, and a certification organization)
and the belief that the above strategies will be followed-can support
impersonal exchange. At its core is making the threat of punishing a borrower
who defaulted credible. If a borrower cheats in his (T - 1),h period, the lenders'
credible threat not to lend again implies that the borrowers' community is worse
off. Because the lender knows the communal and personal identity of the
cheater, and expects to be compensated if he complains, he will do so. The BC
finds it optimal to punish a cheater because it is optimal for the younger cohorts.
A borrower thus finds it optimal to repay his debt. Anticipating that this will be
the case, lenders find it optimal to verify a borrower's identity and lend.
Communal (local) enforcement overrides the fear of losing future gain from
exchange in inducing honesty.
The CRS thus enables exchange that is impersonal-up to one's communal
identity-by mitigating all the problems that hinder impersonal exchange in the
absence of communities. It mitigates the end game problem because the
community, although it aggregates only the payoffs of its living members,
becomes de facto a substitute for a single infinite-horizon player. The reputation
of the community is placed as a bond for the behavior of each of its members.
Public information is endogenously generated because a lender who was cheated
is motivated to complain. At the same time, the strategies of the players imply
that a lender does not benefit from furnishing false claims, and courts are
motivated to examine the validity of claims. This model does not account for
why, on the equilibrium path, lenders and borrowers would be motivated to
verify whether the state is one of cooperation or not. After all, conflict would
not occur in this model. When it is expanded, as is done below to include
imperfect monitoring, conflicts of a finite length occur on the equilibrium path
and borrowers (lenders) are motivated to learn about the state as long as the cost
of doing so is sufficiently low.
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The CRS changes the information required for impersonal exchange. No
lender needs to know the past actions of a borrower. Nor does each lender need
to know the personal identity-to be able to recognize-every borrower. To
sustain exchange, one only needs to know the communal affiliation and personal
identity of his current match. This can be done by approaching the certifying
organization of the lenders' court. Finally, non-contractual, joint communal
liability and communal reputation get around the problem of local partial justice.
Partial courts are endogenously motivated to provide impartial justice.
IV. THE COMMUNITY RESPONSIBILITY SYSTEM: A HISTORY
Historical evidence supports the claim that the CRS prevailed during the
late medieval period throughout Europe. In substantiating the importance of the
CRS, the discussion first provides anecdotal evidence for the operation of the
CRS, drawing in particular on the history of England and Florence. It then turns
to more systematic evidence regarding the scope and the origin of the system.
The strategy associated with the CRS calls for holding a person's
community members liable for his default in inter-community exchange. This
strategy is apparent even in documents related to inter-community exchange
within the same political unit. In a charter given to London sometime between
1130 and 1133, the King, Henry I, announced that "all debtors to the citizens of
London discharge their debts, or prove in London that they do not owe them;
and if they refuse either to pay or to come and make such proof, then the
citizens to whom the debts are due may take pledges within the city either from
the borough or from the village or from the county in which the debtor lives. 38
This document also reflects that in England at least, a community de facto
was the smallest municipal or administrative unit-borough, village, or countythat could be pressed to penalize a culprit. English legal documents indicate that
at times one's merchant guild-which in many cases was also the governing
body of the borough-was one's relevant community. 39 The same strategy
governed the relationships between members of English communities and those
of other political units. Consider, for example, a statement made by King Henry
III in 1266. The King granted "to his burgesses and merchants of Lubek, that
during the king's life, they or their goods within the king's power shall not be
arrested for any debt whereof they are not sureties or principal debtors; unless
the debtors are of their commune and power and have wherewith to pay in
38

Douglas and Greenaway, eds, 2 English HistoricalDocuments at 946 (cited in note 24). For a general
discussion, see William Stubbs, ed, Select Chartersand OtherIllustrations of English ConstitutionalHistoy
from the EarliestTimes to the Reign of Edward the First(Oxford 9th ed 1913).

39

F.W. Maidand, ed, 1 Select Pleasin Manorialand Other SeignorialCourts: Reigns of Heny III. and Edward
L at 134 (2 Selden Society, Bernard Quaritch 1889) (quoting a guild agreement establishing each
member's liability for the debts of other members).
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whole or part, and the said burgesses of Lubek, by whom the said town is
governed, fail in justice to the men of the king's land and power, and this can
reasonably be proved."4 ° This charter also reflects that the "burgesses of Lubek"
governed the town. The same strategy prevailed in the relationships among
other regions of Europe as is reflected, for example, in a 1252 statute issued by
Margaret, the Countess of Flanders, which held foreign merchants liable for
debts assumed by their peers. 41 The complementary part of the strategy
associated with the CRS-punishment by one's community-is also reflected in
the historical records. Individual responsibility was indirectly enforced through
from
community responsibility: the community would generally seek to extract
42
the defaulter the cost that his default had imposed on his community.
Were rules such as those mentioned above effective in influencing
behavior or were they only statements about how things are supposed to be?
The historical evidence richly indicates that the CRS indeed influenced behavior.
To present events and processes-rather than words-supporting this claim, it
is useful to first extend the above model to explicitly recognize that commercial
disputes can arise and courts have only a limited ability to verify past actions.43
To capture the possibility of commercial disputes and that different courts
can reach different conclusions based on the same evidence, assume that lenderborrower relations are characterized by imperfect monitoring. That is, the lender
receives a signal that is a random variable that depends on the action taken by
the borrower. Particularly, even if cheating has not occurred, the lender's signal

40
41

42

43

Calendarof the PatentRolls Preserved in the Public Record Office, 1266-1272 at 20 (cited in note 24).
Although only a principal debtor or his guarantor could be imprisoned for debt, the goods of
other members of the defaulter's community could be impounded. Verlinden, Markets and Fairsat
135 (cited in note 25).
For example, in response to accusations of a member's cheating a member of another
community, the Commune of Firenze was to press on the culprit to pay the damages himself.
Santini, Appunti Sulla Vendetta Privataat 166 (cited in note 19). Similarly, some English boroughs
went so far as to have a policy whereby once a foreign creditor could establish that a member of
the borough had failed to repay his debt, the authorities would pay him out of the borough's
funds and later they would seek double indemnity from the debtor. Plucknett, Legislation of Edward
I at 137 (cited in note 26).
Disagreement in inter-community exchange over whether one fulfilled his contractual obligation
is reflected, for example, in the Genoese cartulary of Giovanni Scriba. An entry registered on July
22, 1164, indicates that shortly before 1164 a Genoese trader, Amicus Zostro, received a loan
from Xecha Bohadie, a Muslim trader from Tripoli. While Amicus had evidently already arranged
to pay Xecha's brother or son in Sicily, Xecha claimed that no such payment had been made. In
July 1164, following Xecha's assertion that payment had not been made, Amicus sent an agent
named Baldezonus from Genoa to Tripoli carrying six cantras of copper. Baldezonus was
instructed to sell the copper and pay Xecha if the latter would swear in the presence of reliable
witnesses that he would hold neither Amicus nor any other Genoese merchant for ransom.
Chiaundano, ed, 2 II Cartolaredi GiovanniScriba at No 1245 (cited in note 24).

Summer 2004

ChicagoJournalof InternationalLaw

may indicate that he was cheated." Further assume that each court also has an
independent imperfect monitoring ability; if a lender complains, each court
receives a signal indicating whether cheating has occurred. Each court's signal is
public and the signals are not perfectly correlated.45 In other words, courts can
sincerely disagree about whether cheating took place.
Under conditions intuitively similar to those examined in the perfect
monitoring case, there is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium with lending. Two
additional characteristics of this equilibrium, however, are that disputes
regarding past conduct will occur and will be followed by conflicts of finite
durations.46 During conflict, impounding will occur and lending will cease for a
finite number of periods. Although on the equilibrium path no cheating occurs
(in the sense that a borrower chooses not to pay), finite periods of costly conflict
are required to provide the communities and the contracting individuals with the
appropriate incentives. If the BC's strategy calls for compensating the lender,
although it concludes that cheating did not occur, the LC's best response is to
claim that a dispute occurred even if it did not. Similarly, if the LC's strategy calls
for not confiscating when it maintains that cheating occurred, the BC's best
response is not to furnish compensation even if its signal indicates that cheating
occurred, thereby motivating borrowers to cheat. Misrepresenting information
has to be costly and forgone gains from exchange are the means of generating
these costs.47
Hence, if the CRS prevailed, the historical records should provide court
cases reflecting the above strategy of holding community members liable,
confiscating their property, and ceasing trade for a finite period of time
following a dispute.48 In particular, according to the above model, ceasing trade
44

45

The historical records suggest that disputes were more likely to occur when one of the contracting
parties passed away, the debt was old, the contract was not clearly defined, or the contracting
obligations were allegedly fulfilled by the agents of one of the parties rather than one of the
parties themselves.
It is assumed, for simplicity, that if there is no dispute, the courts have perfect monitoring ability.

46

This conclusion qualitatively holds even if one complains of cheating although a dispute did not
occur, and the courts have imperfect monitoring ability in the sense that in positive probability
each court will reach a distinct conclusion following the complaint.

47

Using arbitration is problematic. If it is cheap, it will not provide the appropriate incentives; for
example, the LC will submit claims regarding disputes even if it knew they were groundless. To
restore incentives, the price of arbitration has to be set high, making it less appealing. The only
case known to me is between Volterra and San Gimignano in 1234. The arbitration by the
Council of Florence, however, failed. Santini, Appunti Sulla Vendetta Privata at 168 (cited in note
19). Note, however, that this arbitration was ex post and hence does not fit the theoretical
reasoning for its failure.
Such evidence is indeed ample. For example, in 1238, Beatrice, wife of Marcovaldo of Florence,

48

requested a retaliation against the properties of the people and the Commune of Pisa, for a sum
of 2,000 and interest of 750 dinar piccoli of Genoa, to be paid by the heirs of Ubaldo Viscount
and Torritano, the son of the late Lamberto, and by two Pisans who had posted a guarantee for
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would occur when the two courts differed in their assessment of the situation.
Various commercial treaties reflect that contemporaries indeed considered
retaliation to be unavoidable in cases of disagreements among courts.49
Retaliation was a calculated response aimed at fostering exchange, rather
than an act of revenge. This is suggested by attempts to confine it only to intercommunity commercial matters.5 0 Further evidence that retaliations were a
means to ensure proper incentives rather than compensation per se is suggested
by the observation that they lasted for finite periods, and communities
terminated a retaliation period by announcing a "suspension" without making it
conditional on full compensation. Retaliations arguably lasted long enough to
make misrepresenting information sufficiently costly.5'
The assertion that the CRS enabled inter-community impersonal exchange
gains further support from examining the organizational details of late medieval
trade. Consider, for example, the puzzling features of the Champagne Fairs,
arguably the most important inter-regional trading fairs in Europe during the
twelfth and thirteenth centuries.52 The fairs were not organized as meeting places
them. The retaliation was granted by thepodestd after the Commune of Pisa, which had been asked
for restitution (according to the Statute), denied cooperation. Santini, Appunti Sulla Vendetta Ptivata
at 165 (cited in note 19). That conflicts were a common occurrence is suggested by an 1155
complaint to the Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire, Frederick Barbarossa, from the students
of Bologna's law school that the city of Bologna was holding them liable for debts incurred by
members of their original communities. Peter Munz, Frederick Barbarossa:A Study in MedievalPoliics
77 (Cornell 1969). Disputes were not unique to Italy. In 1270:
Gottschalk of Almaine, burgher of Lynn, complains [in the court of the St. Ives Fair in
England] of the communities of Ghent, Poperingen, Douai, Ypres, and Lisle as subjects
of the countess of Flanders, for that whereas the said Gottschalk caused fourteen sacks
of wool worth seven score marks to be brought from the realm of England to Flanders
to trade with it there and hosted this wool at the house of a certain Henry Thurold on
Sunday.
The wool, however, was detained in Flanders and the loss amounted to about 200 marks. Yet the
Countess of Flanders refused to provide justice. Accordingly, Gottschalk requested that the court
impound the goods of members of the above communities present at the fair. His request was
granted. Charles Gross, ed, 1 Select Cases concerning the Law Merchant, A.D. 1270-1638 at 9-10 (23
Selden Society, Bernard Quaritch 1908) (recording dispute of 14 May 1270).
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A treaty between Pisa and Florence signed in 1214 specifies that retaliation would follow if the
judges were unable to settle the dispute. Santini, Appunti Sulla Vendetta Privataat 165-68 (cited in
note 19). The operation of the CRS critically depended on the ability to verify actions ex post.
Verification is relatively easy in transactions such as credit and contracts for future delivery, but is
more difficult in transactions such as agency relationships in which one has a large latitude in
choosing actions. Indeed, I found no evidence that the CRS governed such transactions.
A 1325 statute from Florence, for example, explicitly enumerated the cases in which it was
appropriate to grant retaliation. It could be granted in cases where there were losses in currency or
goods, damage to property, tax extortion, or personal detention. No retaliation was allowed in
cases involving personal bodily offenses. Santini, Appunti Sulla Vendetta Privata(cited in note 19).
For a discussion of suspension, see Arias, 1 Trattati Commerciali at 177-88 (cited in note 19);
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Santini, Appunti Sulla Vendetta Privata at 165 (cited in note 19).
Verlinden, Markets and Fairs(cited in note 25).
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among individual merchants from different localities.5 3 On the contrary, they
were organized as meeting places for traders from different communities, who
often had their own places of residence, storage, permanent representatives,
scribes, and a consul, who had legal authority over the community members
present at the fair. Although the authorities of the Fairs contracted with various
surrounding rulers to secure the right of passage for merchants on their way to
the fair and safeguard their property rights within the fair, these authorities
relinquished some legal rights over these merchants once they were there.
The rationale behind these arrangements is transparent once one
recognizes that they were part of the organizational features of the CRS. The
common place of residence, scribes, and consuls enabled one to establish the
communal and personal identity of a merchant whom he did not know
personally. A contract written by the scribe of a particular community
constituted proof that a particular member of that specific community assumed
a particular obligation in inter-community exchange.
If a community is held liable for the actions of its members, it has to have
the representation required to verify who its members are, and the ability to
discipline them when necessary. Conversely, the fairs' authorities must have had
the ability to identify members of a particular community and its representatives
in order to approach them when necessary. Indeed, in 1260 the wardens of the
Champagne Fairs could pronounce a sentence of exclusion from the fairs
following a default, and this exclusion was extended to the compatriots of the
defaulters if the judicial authorities of their own towns or principalities did not
compel them to fulfill their obligations.
In smaller fairs and within cities, less extensive arrangements provided the
means to identify one's communal and personal identity. Merchants of the same
community traveled together, lodged together, and witnessed each other's
contracts. Members of distinct communities, even within the same political
entity, were noticeably separate from each other in such mundane ways as how
they spoke, dressed, and cooked. In Italy, the medieval communal structure
survived the longest and local dialects lasted until the twentieth century. Indeed,
contracts and court cases reflect the large extent to which medieval merchants
knew one another's communal affiliations.54
In regions with a relatively strong central political authority, a fair's
authorities were motivated to follow the procedures of the CRS so that they

53

For the possibility of conducting impersonal exchange characterized by separation in time
between the quid and the quo in fairs organized as meeting place among individuals, see Milgrom,
North, and Weingast, 2 Econ & Pol at 1 (cited in note 10).

54

For a general discussion of surnames during this period, see Richard W. Emery, The Use of the
Surname in the Study of Medieval Economic History, 7 Medievalia et Humanistica 43 (1952); Robert
Sabatino Lopez, ConcerningSurnames andPlacesof Origin, 8 Medievalia et Humanistica 6 (1954).
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55
would not be sued by the central authorities if they broke the rules. More
generally, however, fairs' authorities were probably motivated to follow the LC
strategy-holding a community liable to the contractual obligations of each of
56
its members-because running a successful fair was a profitable business.
Providing inter-community impersonal contract enforcement increased the fair's
attractiveness to merchants but the ability to do so critically depended on the
CRS. Without it, fair authorities were unable to extend their reach beyond their
limited geographical areas and the threat of excluding a particular individual
from the fair was arguably rather ineffective. Individuals could not have been
deterred from cheating in their old age or defaulting on their contracts; they
could continue trading through agents or family members.
Understanding the importance of the CRS in fostering trade during the late
medieval reveals the rationale behind a puzzling observation. By and large, fairs
did not have an affiliated community of long distance traders. The merchants of
the large fairs such as the Champagne Fairs or the Fair of St. Ives were local
traders. Although systematic research on this issue is yet to be conducted, it
seems that these traders were active locally and did not travel to other trade
centers. Why would this be the case? Under the CRS, trade centers without an
affiliated community of long-distance traders had a comparative advantage in
providing the contract enforcement in impersonal exchange relative to trade
centers that had such a community. In the latter case, the incentives to prove
inter-community enforcement were diluted since the trade center's own
merchants might have had to bear the cost of retaliation in case of inter-court
disputes. If a merchant from community A sued a member of community B in
the court of community C, the resulting dispute would hurt the merchants from
the C community visiting community B. Hence, community C had much to lose
from adjudicating such disputes. These concerns are explicit in Florentine legal
documents. Only Florentine citizens could have demanded impounding the
goods of alien merchants in a Florentine court.5" Trade centers which did not
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This is well reflected in a thirteenth-century court case from the Fair of St. Botulph in England. A
certain James complained that several merchants from Brussels had cheated him. After verifying
his complaint, the fair bailiff impounded wool belonging to the merchants from Brussels who
were present at the fair, but for some reason released them later on. James responded by entering
a plea against the bailiff before the "lord king" of England. In the plea he complained that the
"bailiff of the fair aforesaid, had wrongfully delivered sacks of the wool aforesaid to the aforesaid
merchants (of Brussels) to the grave damage and manifest loss of James himself, inasmuch as the
same commune has not yet satisfied him in respect to the debt aforesaid." Gross, ed, 1 Select Cases
concerning the Law Merchant,A.D. 1270-1638 at 11-12 (cited in note 48).
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For many examples of using the CRS in the courts of English fairs, see Moore, The Fairs of
MedievalEngland(cited in note 19).
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A. Del Vecchio and E. Casanova, Le Rappresaglie nei Comuni Medievali e Specialmente in FirenZe 14-15
(Ditta Nicola Zanichelli 1894).

Summer 2004

ChicagoJournalof InternationalLaw

have an affiliated merchant community had, therefore, relative advantage in
providing contract enforcement in inter-community, impersonal exchange.
That the CRS was regulated by an imperial law in Germany suggests that it
was the rule rather than the exception in that region of Europe. The fact that we
have hundreds if not thousands of pieces of evidence regarding the CRS from all
over Europe5 8 suggests that it was the rule rather than the exception in Europe.59
By the thirteenth century, the CRS prevailed in the most populated and
commercial European areas, that is, Italy and Flanders, in the largest political
unit, France, and in the best organized country, England.6 ° Arguably, the
emergence of the CRS does not reflect its function. Rather, it reflects the
political process of state formation in Europe during this period in which weak
central control and conflicts between kings and their great lords fostered the
emergence of semi-autonomous communities with intra-community contract
enforcement institutions. In addition, the Europeans shared a legal tradition of
man-made (rather than divine) law which, in the context of self-governed
communities, provided a means for economic agents to directly influence their
legal procedures and laws. Historical processes that led to the rise of self-
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A treaty signed between Pisa and Florence in 1214, for example, contains the provision that if one
community refused to compensate the other, members of the latter would be allowed forty days
to leave town. More than a century later, in 1325 this has become the default in Florence. A
Florentine statute requires the city's administrator to wait one month between declaring and
acting upon any impounding of goods under the CRS. Santini, Appunti Sulla Vendetta Privata at
165, 68-72 (cited in note 19). In England, as reflected in the above charter given to Lubeck,
confiscation was allowed only if the BC failed to provide justice. While the above evidence cannot
be generalized, a 1231 German law reflects a broad transition away from confiscation as it made
such a clause mandatory throughout the Empire. Hans Planitz, Studien Zur Geschichte des Deutschen
ArresqproZesses, 40 Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung ftir Rechtsgeschichte: Germanistische Abteilung
87, 177 (1919).

59
60

Patourel, The MedievalAdministration ofthe ChannelIslands (cited in note 19).
Indeed, examining all the surviving city charters from England indicates that by 1256, cities with
65 percent of the known urban population used the CRS. (Consistent with the above analysis,
none of the surviving charters of the smaller Irish cities reflects the operation of the CRS.) The
population of cities is taken from Paul Bairoch, Jean Batou, and Pierre Ch&vre, eds, The Populaion
of European Ciiesfrom 800 to 1500 at 32-35 (Librairie Droz 1988). I considered only cities with a
population of at least 5,000 people by 1300. A city was considered to have a CRS if its charter
permitted it. For the charters, see Adolphus Ballard, ed, British Borough Charters, 1042-1216
(Cambridge 1913); Adolphus Ballard and James Tait, eds, Brifish Borough Charters, 1216-1307
(Cambridge 1923). See also Moore, The Fairs of Medieval England (cited in note 19) and Plucknett,
Legislation of Edward I (cited in note 26). In Italy, all the major commercial cities-Venice, Genoa,
Florence, Milan, and Pisa-had the CRS as well as numerous smaller ones. See, for example,
Arias, I TraltatiCommerciali (cited in note 19); Del Vecchio and Casanova, Le Rappresaglie nei Comuni
Medievali e Spedalmente in FirenZe at 14-15 (cited in note 57). For evidence regarding Flanders, see
Verlinden, Markets and Fairsat 135 (cited in note 25); regarding France, see Patourel, The Medieval
Administration of the Channel Islands (cited in note 19); regarding Germany, see Planitz, 40
Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung fiir Rechtsgeschichte: Germanistische Abteilung at 87 (cited in
note 58).
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governed communities and a particular legal tradition, as well as the related
economic motivation, led to the emergence of the CRS.
V. INSTITUTIONAL DECLINE AND TRANSITION: FROM THE
CRS TO INDIVIDUAL LEGAL RESPONSIBILITY
The CRS enhanced efficiency by supporting inter-community, impersonal
exchange, but it also entailed costs. Furthermore, the implied costs and benefits
were distributed differently among various members of a community. Ironically,
the same processes that the CRS fostered-growth in the size, number, and
heterogeneity of merchants' communities-contributed over time to diminishing
the system's effectiveness, increased its economic costs, and undermined its
intra-community political viability.61
Theoretically, the growth of cities and the extensive inter-community
interactions that the CRS enabled reduced the cost of falsifying one's community
affiliation and increased the cost of verifying it. Inter-community conflicts were
therefore more likely to occur. The growth in size and number of communities
during the late medieval period was impressive. For example, between 1200 and
1300 the population of Genoa increased from about 30,000 to 100,000, while
that of Venice increased from about 70,000 to about 110,000.62 In England there
were a little more than 200 boroughs at the turn of the thirteenth century, but
there were about 500 at its end.63 By the second half of the thirteenth century,
of verification seem to have hindered
the ease of falsification and the difficulty
64
England.
in
the operation of the CRS
61

62
63
64

Indeed, the decline of the CRS cannot be attributed to the usual suspects of institutional change
during the late medieval period: technological change or the rise of the territorial state. There is
no evidence for such technological change, and while the rise of the state and its pressing needs
contributed to the decline of the CRS in France (particularly during the Hundred Years War), the
CRS declined also in areas such as Italy and Germany, where the rise of the state was not the case.
Bairoch, Batou, and Chnvre, eds, The Populationof European Cities at 43, 49 (cited in note 60).
M.W. Beresford and H.P.R. Finberg, English Medieval Borougbs: A Hand-List (Rowman and
Littlefield 1973).
As Moore has noted, "[t]his procedure [of the CRS] apparently worked well enough in many
cases, but it could be cumbersome and time-consuming both for the creditor and the court: it
usually seems to have involved long disputes over whether or not the original debtor and/or the
men actually being sued for the debt were truly members of their town community or gild, with
everyone scurrying to disclaim responsibility for the obligation." Moore, The Fairs of Medieval
England at 119 (cited in note 19). Similarly, Plucknett noted that "there seems to have been much
trafficking between foreign merchants and natives whose mercantile status was doubtful, and
whose assets and persons were by no means entirely within the territorial jurisdiction of a local
court." Plucknett, Legislation of EdwardI at 138 (cited in note 26).
Indeed, declining confidence in the CRS in England is reflected in the Close Rolls.
Throughout the period under consideration, merchants could have chosen to register debts in
these chancery rolls, thereby placing their transactions under the jurisdiction of the Common
Law. This implies that property and goods could have been placed as bonds for repaying debts.
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Theoretically, the growth in the number of traders increased the total
economic costs of the CRS because more traders increased the probability of
conflict in each period. Furthermore, the increase in the probability of conflict
increased the cost of strategic uncertainty. Courts, after all, could impound
goods only from traders present in their jurisdiction. Whenever conflict loomed
on the horizon, each merchant was motivated to make sure that he was not
present. 65 Yet, most likely, the uncertainty implied by the CRS could not be
completely avoided and as the size of communities grew, the costs of retaliations
and uncertainty increased as well.
The CRS also undermined its own economic efficiency by intensifying the
adverse selection and moral hazard problems associated with commercial
ventures financed by credit. As is well known, under credit financing, the lender
assumes all downside risks while the borrower retains all the gains above a
certain amount. Hence, credit financing encourages borrowing for high-risk
ventures. Appropriate incentives to lenders to evaluate ex ante the
creditworthiness of the borrowers mitigate this problem, but the CRS
undermined such incentives. Even when, as assumed in the above model,
matching is random and one does not know his business partners' past actions, a
lender can still evaluate the creditworthiness of a borrower based on other
signals. In the historical episode under consideration, these signals included the
borrower's age, type of clothing, number of servants, the quality and nature of
the goods he carried, etc.
The CRS, however, reduced the incentive to invest in conducting such an
evaluation relative to a case of individuals' legal responsibility. After all, unlike
individual legal responsibility, under the CRS the future trade of all members of
one's community is the de facto collateral for the loan. Clearly, the incentive to
check creditworthiness is not completely eliminated because of the cost
associated with recovering a loss, but it is less than it would have been if only
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Registration, however, was costly, and prior to 1271 few debts, if any, were enrolled each year. As
long as the CRS functioned well, traders relied on it and did not register their debts. Between
1257 and 1271, however, the number of registered debts increased by a factor of forty-three.
Moore, The Fairsof Medieval Englandat n 105 (cited in note 19). Based on all the available records
in the Close Rolls of the Reign of Heny III, 1256-1259 (His Majesty's Stationery Office 1932); Close
Rolls ofthe Reign of Henry III, 1259-1261 (His Majesty's Stationery Office 1934); Close Rolls ofthe
Reign of Henry III, 1261-1264 (His Majesty's Stationery Office 1936); Close Rolls ofthe Reign of Henry
III, 1264-1268 (1-is Majesty's Stationery Office 1937); Close Rolls ofthe Reign of Henry III, 12681272 (His Majesty's Stationery Office 1938). It should be noted, however, there is only one entry
for 1257; four for 1269; and forty-three for 1271. See Plucknett, Legislation of Edward I at 137
(cited in note 26), regarding the cost of using the common law.
Florence's historical records reflect the impact of this uncertainty. Agreements aimed at reducing
the cost of this uncertainty reflect recognition of this problem. Italian communities agreed to
restrict the penalty that could be imposed on a particular individual or to allocate the costs more
evenly. In some cases, attempts were made to use taxes on members of a community to allocate
the costs of retaliation. Arias, I TratatiCommerciali at 52, 156-58, 165 (cited in note 19).
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borrowers had been held responsible for their debts. Hence, the CRS arguably
fostered the entry of more merchants with a higher probability of being unable
66
to repay their loans as the size of communities increased.
Recognition of the above problems and their relationship to the CRS is
indirectly reflected in the seemingly puzzling changes in laws and rules that took
place during the thirteenth century. In Italy, England, and Germany the
authorities increased the cost of default to the lender by demanding that prior to
requesting justice from his community's legal authorities, a lender had to travel
to the borrower's community and make his case there. Only if justice was not
6
provided could he apply to his community court to request retaliation. " In Italy,
apart from a similar shift in the lender's obligation, there seems to have been a
move during this time from personal law toward territorial law. Alien merchants
who were previously under the jurisdiction of their communities while abroad
placed under the authority of the community in which they
were increasingly
68
present.
were
Such changes are puzzling. Why punish a lender who was not paid? Why
was there a transition to territorial law? These changes, however, are consistent
with the argument that the CRS was contributing to its own demise by fostering
the adverse selection and moral hazard problems, and increasing the cost to a
lender countered these factors' increasingly negative impact on trade. Increasing
the cost of default to lenders provided them with more incentives to evaluate
borrowers' creditworthiness. The shift toward territorial law seems to reflect an
attempt to increase the cost of default to borrowers given that the intercommunity interactions the CRS fostered made immigration easier.
The ability to mitigate the problem of runaway defaulters, however, was
limited, probably because of the courts' limited ability to check the identity of
non-residents (as discussed in Section III). Even in the well-organized kingdom
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Awareness that the CRS intensified the problems associated with credit financing is well reflected
in a document from February 8, 1281 in which several cities in Tuscany agreed not to retaliate
against each other. In announcing this agreement to their merchants, the authorities stated that
the local merchants should start paying more attention to the personal creditworthiness of the
foreign merchants with whom they would be dealing, as henceforth "a chui dat a colui recbesto"
(that is, "to whom it is given, from him it will be asked") and if he is not able to pay, impounding
goods from his community members will not be permitted. Id at 166-67.
In Germany, this change is reflected in the above-mentioned Imperial Decree from 1231. In
England, it is reflected in various charters. The City of Cambridge, for example, received a charter
and the right to establish a merchant guild as early as the middle of the twelfth century, but only
later charters reflect rules increasing the cost of default to lenders. Maitland and Bateson, eds, The

Charters of the Borough of Cambridge at 15 (cited in note 19).
See, for example, Arias, I Trattati Commerdali at 100 (cited in note 19) (discussing a 1279 treaty
between Tuscan towns).
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of England, authorities were known to have been usually unable to locate an
individual who escaped from his place of residence.69
The mere fact that the CRS was probably becoming less efficient and more
economically costly over time would not necessarily have led to its decline. What
seems to have induced attempts to abolish the system was the reduction in its
intra-community political viability. The intra-community social and economic
heterogeneity to which the CRS contributed implied that within a community
the costs and benefits of the CRS were not distributed evenly. Those who gained
relatively little, therefore, were thus motivated to abolish it.
If correct, this assertion has two implications: first, larger-and hence
arguably more heterogeneous-communities were likely to attempt to abolish
the CRS; second, rich, well-established merchants would wish to abolish the
CRS. After all, wealthy merchants gained less from the CRS because they had
the connections, reputation, and wealth to conduct personal trade, and they bore
more of its cost because they had more wealth abroad. Similarly, a community's
non-mercantile component was likely to want to abolish the CRS. Although they
bore some cost during a conflict due to the absence of alien merchants, they did
not directly gain from the CRS.
Indeed, the historical records reflect a decline in the CRS that is consistent
with the above predictions. In England and Italy alike, wealthy traders and large
communities sought exemptions from the CRS or wanted to abolish it
altogether. Moore examined cases brought before the court of the St. Ives Fair
in England and noticed that in the second half of the thirteenth century there
"were increasing numbers of individuals ... able to respond to ...suits [related
to the CRS] by producing royal licences of immunity from prosecution for any
debts except those for which they were principal debtors or pledges. 7 °
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70

Plucknett, Legislation of Edward I at 142 (cited in note 26). As late as the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries, "a felon could consider himself distinctly unlucky if he was captured by the
authorities." John Bellamy, Crime and Public in England in the Later Middle Ages 201 (Rutledge and
Kegan Paul 1973). In England, as a matter of fact, one did not even have to escape in order to
avoid paying a debt. During this period English law precluded selling one's house or real estate to
repay a loan, or even punishing a borrower who defaulted with imprisonment. W.J. Jones, The
Foundations of Engisb Bankruptcy: Statutes and Commissions in the Early Modern Period (Am
Philosophical Soc 1979).
See Moore, The FairsofMedievalEngland at 119 (cited in note 19) (noting a dramatic increase of St.
Ives Fair merchants possessing royal licenses of exemption from suit to satisfy any debt for which
they were neither principals nor pledgors); Douglas and Greenaway, eds, 2 English Historical
Documents at 945-46 (cited in note 24) (In 1133 Henry I gave Londoners freedom from the
jurisdiction of any court outside of London.); and Calendarof the PatentRolls Preservedin the Public
Records Office, 1225-1232 at 460 (His Majesty's Stationery Office 1903) (Sometime between 1225
and 1232, Henry III assured the merchants of Ypres that none of them "will be detained in
England .. .nor will they be partitions for another's debts." However, the Ypres were subject to,
and could avail themselves of, the jurisdiction of the royal courts.).
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In England, large communities approached the king seeking exemptions
from the CRS. Italian historical records also reflect a reduction in the intra7
community political viability of the CRS. Indeed, attempts to abolish the CRS
in Florence reflect the interests of particular segments in the city. The mercatores
of Florence were the city's affluent merchants whose business during the
thirteenth century was carried out over most of Europe, as far north as Sweden.
While they may have had the ability to exchange based on their own reputations,
they had a great deal to lose from retaliation. Once they secured political control
over the city, they entered into a sequence of treaties aimed at moving Florence
away from the CRS.12 That most of Italy's large city-states also sought an end to
the CRS in the thirteenth century suggests that by then, the most important
Italian communities wanted to abolish it.
While, most likely, similar factors contributed to the decline of the CRS in
various parts of Europe, the ability to devise an alternative system depended on
the larger political context. In Italy, there was no third party-such as a kingthat could have devised an impartial legal system. Indeed, although intercommunity treaties to abolish the CRS in Italy were signed during the early and
then the late thirteenth century, retaliation continued in future centuries. In
Germany, the disintegration of the Empire during this period implied that no
central ruler was available either. Germany seems to have resorted to a "feud
system" in which a merchant would have to hire a feudal lord and use a
mercenary army in order to force a community to compensate him for a
default.7 3 This was not the case in England, where the state enabled the
communities to abolish the CRS. However, even in England the CRS system
died slowly. The first alternative contract enforcement institution was put in
74
place under Edward I, in multiple steps between 1275 and 1285. In 1275, King
71
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See, for example, Arias, I Trattali Commeriali at 165 (cited in note 19) (discussing one group of
merchants' attempt to settle a dispute with Bologna despite seeming indifference on the part of
the general Florentine establishment); see also id at 400-04 (Latin version of a treaty between
Florence, Venice, and Genoa, as well as most of the cities of Tuscany, Lombardy, Romagna, and
Marca Trevigia, ending the CRS system and enabling impersonal inter-community exchange by an
agreement by each town to imprison any merchant in its territory who was fleeing with other
people's money and to provide justice to his creditors); Santini, Appunti Sulla Vendetta Privata at
168-72 (cited in note 19) (By 1415 it was forbidden to retaliate against foreign rectors, officials, or
against traders coming to Florence to sell edibles.).
Arias, I Trattati Commerialiat 170-76 (cited in note 19).
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Oliver Volckart, The Economics of Feuding in Late Medieval Germany (2001) (working paper, Institut
fir Wirtschaftsgeschichte, Berlin), available online at <http://www.isnie.org/ISNIE02/
Papers02/volckart.pdf> (visited Mar 28, 2004).
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The alternative contract enforcement institution established by Edward I may have been
influenced by a similar institution that had been enacted in France. See discussion in Patourel, The
MedievalAdministraionof the Channel Islands at 97 (cited in note 19), who also refers to the work of
A. Giry, Manuel de Diplomatique 649-52, 835-54 (Librairie Hachette et Cie 1894), who discusses
this institution in France. The crucial components of the new institution were laid down in the
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Edward I issued the Statute of Westminster I that forbade applying community
responsibility to debts, and established the following ruling with respect to any
"stranger who is of this kingdom" (namely, an Englishman from one locality
present in another).7 5 Such an individual should not "be distrained in a city,
borough, viii, fair or market for what he is neither debtor nor pledge for, and he
who does this is to be severely punished and the distress is to be released
without delay by the bailiffs of the place or by the other, the king's bailiffs if
need be.'76 Edward seems to have abolished the system, recognizing its cost,
only to later realize its benefits and gradually introduce an alternative based on
individual legal liability. A contract enforcement institution based on individual
responsibility, similar to the contract enforcement institution based on collective
responsibility that it replaced, developed slowly.
Changes and refinements in the CRS are reflected in historical documents
long before the thirteenth century. After all, documents reflecting such changes
constitute important evidence for the system and its effectiveness. The interests
of individual merchants in becoming exempt from the system were not new in
that century either. But the thirteenth century was nevertheless a turning point in
the historical process through which contract enforcement institutions governed
impersonal change. It was the first time that there was a wholesale abolishment
of the system on the one hand, and the provision of relatively effective
alternative-at least within some territorially large political units--on the other.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The Community Responsibility System enabled impersonal exchange
during the late medieval period. This exchange was impersonal in the sense that
Statute of Westminter I (1273), the Statute of Acton Burnell (1283), the Statute of Westminter II
(1285), and the Statute of Merchants (1285). For texts of the statutes, see Harry Rothwell, ed, 3
Engish HistoricalDocuments, 1189-1327 at 404, 420-22, 428-57 (Eyre and Spottiswoode 1975). For
a discussion of the statutes and the continuing limits on contract enforcement, see Plucknett,
Legislation of Edward I at 138-50, 324-26, 343 (cited in note 26); Moore, The Fairs of Medieval
Englandat 102, 120 (cited in note 19); Jones, The Foundations of Eng'sh Bankrupty at 13-16 (cited in
note 69) (Even as late as 1543, the authorities could not break into the locked house of a debtor
75
76

who defaulted on his debt.).
Rothwell, ed, 3 English HistoricalDocuments, 1189-1327 at 404 (cited in note 74).
Id. The Statute of Westminster I did not establish any alternative institution for contract
enforcement and the results in terms of an inability to contract were apparently severe (although
the merchants could have used, as mentioned above, the costly and time consuming common law
court). A later statute in 1283 declared that:
merchants who in the past have lent their substance to various people are impoverished
because there was no speedy law provided by which they could readily recover their
debts on the day fixed for payment, and for that reason many merchants are put off
from coming to this land with their merchandise to the detriment of merchants and of
the whole kingdom.
Id at 420.
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individuals who did not expect to transact again did not condition their decision
whether or not to exchange upon knowledge of one's past actions or the ability
to transmit one's identity to future exchange partners. The CRS enabled
exchange that was impersonal, up to one's community affiliation, despite the
absence of a centralized legal system provided by the state, the impartiality of the
local courts, the finite lifetimes of humans, and the difficulties in communicating
one's identity and verifying past actions.
The CRS was a self-enforcing institution in the sense that all relevant
incentives-to individual traders and their communities-were provided
endogenously. Initially, it was also a self-reinforcing institution, in that it led to
processes that increased the range of parameters within which it was selfenforcing. 7 While the CRS was based on the existing, community-based social
structure, it reinforced this structure by motivating the community members to
clearly define their communal membership, to establish the organizations
required to indicate who their members were to the rest of the society, and to
strengthen their intra-community enforcement institutions. Similarly, the CRS
was reinforced by the introduction of other supporting organizations, structures,
rules, and regulations.
But in the long run, the CRS was a self-undermining institution. Its own
implications bred processes leading to its destruction. The CRS contributed to
the growth of long-distance trade and the size, number, and heterogeneity of
communities, and these changes undermined its self-enforceability. They
reduced the system's effectiveness, economic efficiency, and its intra-community
political support. Such processes made it easier, for example, to falsify one's
community affiliation, hindered verification of this affiliation, reduced the cost
of inter-community mobility, increased the severity of the adverse selection and
moral hazard problems, and made some members of the community worse off
under the system then they otherwise would have been. Over time, certain
members of communities sought exemptions from the CRS, and communities
themselves were laboring to abolish it. Where possible, the state stepped in to
provide an alternative. The European economic institutions moved closer to
their current situation in relying on individual legal responsibility and relatively
impartial law provided by the state and reputation considerations that
complement each other.
Yet collective responsibility still plays a role in contemporary economies,
and the extent of impersonal exchange feasible in Europe is yet to be
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See Greif, Institufions (cited in note 30) on the relationships between self-enforcing, selfreinforcing, and self-undermining institutions. Intuitively, a self-enforcing institution re-enforces
(or undermines) itself when its implications increase (or decrease) the set of parameters in which
it is self-enforcing.
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accomplished in many developing countries."8 Collective responsibility plays a
role in micro-lending in developing countries and in inducing sovereigns to pay
their international debts.79 Collective reputation is important in business
associations where partners can assume joint and unlimited liability8 ° and
arguably, the modern firm is, like the CRS, a mechanism that fosters impersonal
exchange. The firm's reputation enables exchange between its many
(anonymous) workers and those who buy the product of their labor. A firm's
reputation and its intra-firm ability to discipline workers facilitate exchange
between these workers and outside consumers. Collective responsibility is
voluntary and contractual. Indeed, as Levinson has noted, because collective
responsibility is closely associated in our mind with racism, we fail to see the
large extent to which it can be harnessed for the production of a collective
good.81
We have no theory regarding the optimal scope of voluntary and
involuntary collective responsibility and we know little regarding the historical
processes and factors that determined the evolution of this scope in various
economies. Nor do we know much regarding the interplay between contract
enforcement institutions that supported impersonal exchange and the
development of impartial legal system. More generally, if the ability to enter into
impersonal exchange is a key to the division of labor and the rise of market
economies, comparative studies of the evolution of contract enforcement
institutions facilitating impersonal exchange are likely to greatly enhance our
understanding of the diverse historical process of economic development in
various societies.

78

For a theoretical analysis see, for example, Hal R. Varian, MonitoringAgents with OtherAgents, 146 J
Inst & Theoretical Econ 153 (1990); Tirole, 63 Rev Econ Studies at 1 (cited in note 12); Kranton,
86 Am Econ Rev at 830 (cited in note 2); Richard Ball, Individualism, Collectivism, and Economic
Development, 573 Annals Am Acad Pol & Soc Sci 57 (an 2001).
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On micro-lending see, for example, Timothy Besley and Stephen Coate, Group Lending, Repayment
Incentives and Social Collateral,46 J Development Econ 1 (Feb 1995); F.J.A. Bouman, Rotating and
Accumulating Savings and Credit Associations: A Development Perspective, 23 World Development 371
(Mar 1995). On sovereign debt see, for example, Bulow and Kenneth, 97 J Pol Econ at 155 (cited
in note 12).
See, for example, Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal ContractualRelations in the
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Diamond Industry, 21 J Legal Studies 115 (1992).
Daryl J. Levinson, Collective Sanctions, 56 Stan L Rev 345 (2003).
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